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1 
Experimental evidence on the relative efficiency of forward contracting and tradable 1 
entitlements in water markets 2 
ABSTRACT 3 
This paper experimentally tests if adding forward trading or tradable entitlements to already 4 
commonly used spot trade in water markets improves allocation and production efficiency. We 5 
find that forward contracts significantly increase efficiency, while tradable entitlements do not. 6 
The advantage of forward contracts increases further after a climate change shock, which reduces 7 
the expected total water supply. However, tradable water entitlements are rather more damaging 8 
than beneficial. Due to the complexity involved in pricing entitlements they not only fail to 9 
increase efficiency, but are often seriously mispriced, which results in concentrated holdings and 10 
considerable wealth inequality across market participants. 11 
 12 
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1. INTRODUCTION 15 
Increasing future water scarcity as a consequence of climate change or competition among user 16 
groups is recognized as a global risk (World Economic Forum, 2015). Recognition of this risk has 17 
led regional governments in countries such as the United States, Spain, Mexico, Chile and 18 
Australia to develop and adopt water markets (Grafton, Libecap, McGlennon, Landry and O’Brien, 19 
2011) that: facilitate reallocation of scarce resources across competing demands (Matthews, 2004), 20 
reduce agricultural sector risk and uncertainty in production decisions (Calatrava and Garrido, 21 
2005), and minimize productive disruptions during periods of drought (Wittwer and Griffith, 22 
2011). There are some specific properties of the commodity of water and its use in agriculture 23 
which have to be taken into account when trading institutions are designed. The three most 24 
important are as follows. First the total supply of water varies across time and is not known ex 25 
2 
ante. Second, property rights are not naturally assigned. And finally, production decisions (i.e. 26 
sowing and decisions on livestock) have to be taken before the total supply for the relevant period 27 
is known. These properties imply that an efficient trading system a) assigns property rights 28 
conditional on current supply, b) allocates the available water efficiently within a production 29 
period, once production decisions have been taken and c) induces efficient production decisions 30 
given the uncertainty of water supply. A commonly used market instrument is tradable water 31 
allocations. Depending on the total supply of water within a season water is initially allocated 32 
according to some entitlement1, and can then be traded on a spot market. Theoretically, such a 33 
setup is sufficient to achieve efficiency if some assumptions hold. If the spot market works 34 
efficiently and market power is absent, then annual water supplies will be allocated efficiently 35 
conditional on the production decisions taken. Thus, if market participants have enough 36 
information and hold rational expectations such that they can properly predict water prices for all 37 
possible total supply scenarios, they can make efficient production decisions. 38 
If for some reason producers face uncertainty about the ensuing prices for different future 39 
rainfall scenarios then additional market institutions have the potential to improve efficiency 40 
(Gaydon, Mienke, Rodriguez and McGrath, 2012). The two most appealing mechanisms are: 41 
tradeable entitlements akin to permanent property rights, and derivatives such as forward contracts 42 
or options. A crop farmer might only want to commit to production (i.e. plant or sow) if she has 43 
secured enough future water for irrigation. If entitlements are tradeable (licenses trade), then 44 
producers who are highly water dependent can mitigate their risk of not being able to secure 45 
enough water in the spot market by purchasing additional entitlements ahead of production 46 
decisions. Similarly, derivative products (forward contracts) enable participants to insure 47 
                                                          
1 In this case, a water entitlement represents a correlative or mutual relationship right where holders own a share of 
the total available consumptive pool. This is different to absolute rights, such as those based on seniority, which are 
based on volume and priority. 
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themselves against unfavourable future spot-price movements (Wolak, 2000).2 While it is possible 48 
to theoretically evaluate different water market institutions, the results depend on the assumptions 49 
made. For an evaluation of the impact of license trading and forward markets, assumptions 50 
regarding rationality and expectation formation by the market participants are particularly 51 
important. It is a priori unclear to which extent, and how, deviations from full rationality and 52 
rational expectations may influence efficiency under different market institutions. Moreover, given 53 
the number of market participants and the complexity of water markets, it is unlikely that all 54 
participants always exhibit rational expectations and obey full rationality. This paper therefore 55 
uses experimental techniques to evaluate the welfare implications when tradeable licenses or 56 
forward contracts are added to a standard spot market. 57 
Our experimental environment captures the most salient elements of agriculture. Farmers 58 
live for multiple periods, and survival is stochastic. Production decisions have to be taken before 59 
the total supply of water is known. A heterogeneity of production technologies models different 60 
crops and different farm sizes and allows for gains from water trade. Finally, we introduce a 61 
climate-change shock that reduces the expected amount of water, in order to be able to judge which 62 
trading institution best deals with such shocks. Note, however, that our setup is generic. It does 63 
not try to closely mimic conditions in any specific region. Instead we are looking for general 64 
behavioural regularities. For that reason all results are of a qualitative nature only. The dynamic 65 
feature of our environment is crucial for investigating license trade in particular. To our knowledge 66 
this paper is the first experimental paper with long-lived farmers who bring forward their tradable 67 
water entitlements and bank balances from period to period, and who earn or have to pay interest. 68 
This allows us to look at the important long-term implications of license trade. The consequences 69 
                                                          
2 Following significant legislative evaluation and change forward contracts are being slowly introduced to Australian 
water markets (Waterfind, 2014). 
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of water markets and license trading for the long-term efficiency of production and the wealth 70 
distribution in the industry can only be assessed in a dynamic experiment.  71 
Besides the obvious policy relevance of our work we also make a methodological 72 
contribution. Our setup can be used for other questions where long-term impact of markets, 73 
policies or individual decisions is of interest. The underlying model has two main advantages over 74 
other models when implementation in the laboratory is a concern. First of all, the equilibrium 75 
predictions are time-invariant. For example, dynamic models with finite periods would have 76 
declining equilibrium license prices, which make it hard to compare behaviour over periods, and 77 
are also known to cause bubbles in asset experiments (Noussair and Tucker, 2006). The time-78 
invariance in our model does not only require a stochastic stopping rule but also the modelling 79 
trick of including bequests in the farmer’s objective function. To our knowledge we are the first to 80 
propose such an environment. Secondly, our setup does not require an induced discount rate. 81 
Induced discount rates are problematic, as they reduce the money at stake – and therefore the 82 
incentives to try hard – for participants in later rounds (Harrison, Lau and Rutström, 2010). We 83 
find that adding forward contracts to the spot market significantly increases efficiency, while added 84 
license trade does not improve efficiency compared to spot markets alone. If they have an impact 85 
at all, then tradable water entitlements are rather more damaging than beneficial. Due to the 86 
complexity involved in pricing entitlements, valuations differ largely across market participants 87 
which leads to concentration of the entitlements through trade. This both leads to inefficient 88 
production decisions and to large wealth inequality. The latter is further exacerbated, since the 89 
market is not able to remove mispricing. Further, our finding that forward contracts are a very 90 
useful measure to improve efficiency even in an environment where under full rationality spot 91 
markets alone could do the job, is highly robust to system shocks. Under forward contracts the 92 
adjustment after the climate-change shock works best. 93 
 94 
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2. RELATED LITERATURE 95 
The most common forms of water market trade involve simple (spot) transfers of temporary water 96 
allocations. In some countries more risk-averse farmers are motivated to buy water entitlements 97 
from less risk-averse farmers to insure themselves against supply shocks , where in other places 98 
complex water right transfer products are evolving to manage water supply-scarcity risk (Cristi, 99 
2007). Complex water trade derivatives may enable farmers to increase earnings and generate 100 
additional water transfers at the margin, relative to traditional (spot-market) water transfers 101 
(Hansen, Howitt and Williams, 2008). Derivative products include option (futures) and forward 102 
contracts that require a buyer to purchase water-rights from a seller at an execution date for a 103 
previously agreed price. There is a subtle difference between the two derivative types: once entered 104 
into, forward contracts must be fulfilled; whereas with option contracts the buyer (seller) is allowed 105 
to forgo the water purchase (sale) before the contract expiration date but the option deposit will 106 
forfeit to the seller (buyer) (Hadjigeorgalis, 2009). Ignoring the potential benefits from derivative 107 
water trade may place additional and significant future imposts on the public purse (Leroux and 108 
Crase, 2010). Thus a fuller understanding of water market efficiency outcomes could facilitate 109 
improved trading institutions that allow participants to better coordinate their decision making 110 
(Suter, Spraggon and Poe, 2013). 111 
Experimental examination of forward contracting features extensively in tradeable emission 112 
permit markets, where such products can: assist in the management of strategic behaviour 113 
(arbitrage) (Allaz and Vila, 1993); improve market cost efficiencies from increased trade volumes 114 
and dynamic efficiencies associated with cross-period uncertainty (Godby, Mestelman, Muller and 115 
Welland, 1997, Muller and Mestelman, 1994); reduce supply shock impacts and help to avoid 116 
increased spot market prices (Wolak, 2003); provide design and implementation advantages over 117 
existing trade products and help to manage uncertainty between periods (Maeda, 2004); and dilute 118 
market power among oligopolistic energy providers (Brandts, Pezanis‐Christou and Schram, 119 
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2008). Water managers may be similarly interested in strategic behaviour or supply-shock market 120 
impacts, but water market structures are not typically oligopolistic in nature. Further, assessments 121 
of efficiency improvements from license trade and forward contracting is less common in water 122 
market settings, possibly reflecting the relative immaturity of water markets in many instances 123 
especially with regard to information collection and dissemination among water users (e.g. 124 
farmers). Insights can arise from better understanding the design details of license trading schemes, 125 
such as in pollution permits (Montgomery, 1972). While there are numerous examples in pollution 126 
and electricity market settings of share and coupon comparisons (e.g. Muller and Mestelman, 127 
1994) and studies concerning the ability to bank or borrow permits (e.g. Maeda, 2004), there are 128 
fewer studies providing insight into the initial allocation arrangements for permits/shares beyond 129 
auction arrangements—especially in the water literature where property rights are typically 130 
‘grandfathered’ according to historic or pre-determined systems. Given the high prevalence of spot 131 
market activity with high variability in most water markets we are also keen to test for price-132 
stabilization benefits from incorporating license and forward contract trade. 133 
The seminal work on commodity-price stabilization by Newbery and Stiglitz sparked two 134 
competing theoretical literature strands on the effects of forward contract use by firms competing 135 
over quantity (Schubert, 2013). The first strand (Le Coq and Orzen, 2006) argues that forward 136 
contracts increase competition and market efficiency by improving the spot market position of 137 
some firms relative to others when they sell some quantity of product forward. The second strand 138 
challenges the market efficiency increasing prediction arguing that forward markets can only drive 139 
efficiency under finite horizon assumptions. When this assumption is relaxed, for example in the 140 
case of infinitely repeated oligopoly settings as found by Liski and Montero (2006), forward 141 
contracts result in tacit firm collusion or strategic behaviour, particularly where such action may 142 
increase market power (Murphy and Smeers, 2010). Importantly the range of discount factors that 143 
support the collusive equilibrium is wider under repeated firm interaction in both forward and spot 144 
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markets (Schubert, 2013). The theoretical disparity surrounding efficiency improvements between 145 
spot and forward contract markets in the context of future uncertainty justifies additional research 146 
in the area. In water markets where market power may be of less concern dependent upon the 147 
number of participants and heterogeneity of water uses, and where periodic shock impacts to both 148 
supply and demand spot prices may be mitigated by derivatives, valuable insights can be gained 149 
by experiments in water trade product design and implementation—especially with regard to 150 
increased water market efficiency. 151 
Using real world data for such an analysis is difficult. First of all we do not know of any 152 
natural experiment which would allow for a causal examination of the impact of forward contracts 153 
to water. Moreover, the lack of information on individual production functions and expected 154 
product prices makes it hard to separate between different pricing determinants such as technology, 155 
expectations, or bounded rationality. There are also policy benefits to evaluating water market 156 
mechanisms through experimental economic approaches prior to implementing institutional and/or 157 
design changes (Suter, Duke, Messer and Michael, 2012) particularly where insufficient data for 158 
conventional econometric analysis is available (Hansen, Howitt and Williams, 2008). 159 
Previous experimental approaches to estimating allocative efficiency gains from the trade of 160 
water products provide a great deal of insight. For example Connor et al. (2008) used an 161 
experimental setting to test the significance of impediments to a proposed dryland cap and trade 162 
water salinity credit system. Other experimental economic analysis has focused on the effects of 163 
regulatory restrictions (Garrido, 2007); the presence of significant environmental agency trade 164 
(Tisdell, 2010); and the advantages of double-auction structures for water allocation markets 165 
(Tisdell, 2011). Further, Hansen et al. (2008) used an experimental setting to include option 166 
contracts between competitive/monopsony water agents and smaller water users in California to 167 
manage dry-year supply risk. Finally, Lefebvre et al. (2012) innovatively combine both water 168 
license and spot markets in experimental settings to estimate the impact of transaction costs and 169 
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supply reliability levels on trade behaviour, without investigating derivative water trade 170 
arrangements specifically. The main contribution of our paper is such a specific investigation. We 171 
therefore addresses the following two research questions: a) does the introduction of tradable 172 
licenses and forward contracting increase efficiency compared to having only a spot market; and 173 
b) does the presence of a climate (i.e. supply variability) shock impact upon the efficiency of trade 174 
across the spectrum of water market products? Contrary to Lefebvre et al. (2012) these questions 175 
are considered in the context of dynamic short-term (i.e. intra-seasonal) water management 176 
decision making, which have long-term impacts through the license holdings and balance sheets 177 
of farmers. 178 
 179 
3. THEORETICAL ENVIRONMENT 180 
The objective of the experiment is to create a dynamic world where subjects acting as farmers have 181 
to make a series of decisions over multiple periods that broadly reflect reality. A context-rich 182 
experimental setting can offer appropriate methods for drawing inferences about behaviour when 183 
investigating policy design (Suter and Vossler, 2013). Ultimately the experiment sets out to test, 184 
in contrast with a control treatment where only spot rights are traded, whether water license 185 
transfers or forward contracts yield more efficient market outcomes. Beyond the control group we 186 
implement two main treatments which only differ in the trading institution. The timing within one 187 
period is as follows: 188 
1. Depending on the non-control treatment, a license or a forward contract auction takes place. 189 
2. Farmers decide to sow (i.e. to produce) or not. 190 
3. Farmers are told their (seasonal) water allocation for the current period. 191 
4. A double-auction spot water market occurs, and in the forward contract treatment contracts 192 
are executed. 193 
5. Production and consumption take place. 194 
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6. The bank balance is updated and interest is paid (borrowing occurs). 195 
Reflecting typical conditions in countries with water markets, resources are allocated in the 196 
experimental environment on the basis of licenses owned and a range of seasonal conditions (i.e. 197 
dry, normal or wet).3 Our modelled farmers' world consists of a dynamic general equilibrium 198 
model. The design of the model is governed by the trade-off between realism and simplicity. On 199 
the one hand, an overly simple model will not capture the relevant influences in farming and 200 
irrigation markets. On the other hand, an over-complicated framework leads to subject confusion 201 
and consequent loss of experimental control. A nice side-effect of using a model of intermediate 202 
complexity is that we obtain a time-independent equilibrium prediction which can be used as a 203 
benchmark to compare with observed behaviour. In what follows, we develop our model. To 204 
provide the reader with the easiest way to get a good feel for the experimental environment we 205 
fully present the model with the functional form assumptions and parameters used in the 206 
experiments. 207 
3.1 The farmer's objective and the evolution of wealth holdings 208 
A farmer's objective is to maximize expected lifetime utility. The future is uncertain, and after 209 
each period the probability of survival is δ with the probability 1-δ that the farmer dies.4 At each 210 
point in time the farmer's expected lifetime utility is fully characterised by the sum of past 211 
consumption utilities, which is sunk and current asset holdings. In our world with bequest motives 212 
it turns out that the optimal consumption level is time and wealth invariant. As we are not interested 213 
in farmers' consumption choices we fix consumption at the optimal level in the experiment and 214 
deduct that amount of money from farmers' bank accounts each period. The current wealth of 215 
                                                          
3 Within our experiment normal conditions provide the average water supply (e.g. two units per license). Dry 
conditions reduce water supply limit to one unit, while wet conditions increase it to three units per license. 
4 A probabilistic stopping rule is an alternative to discounting over an infinite horizon, which can be used to induce 
stationary equilibria and mimic infinitely repeated play (Carbone, 2006, Carbone and Hey, 2004). 
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farmer i in period t is thus modelled by the farmer's fixed consumption 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and their bank balance 216 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. The lifetime utility of a farmer who dies in period τ is defined as: 217 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡=1 �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏. 218 
This assumes that farmers have bequest motives, with β indicating the relative bequest 219 
motive importance. The bequest motive is required for c* to be constant over time; otherwise you 220 
would consume more when young since you would not want to risk having money left when you 221 
die. As in real life, farmers can also choose to borrow or deposit money units, produce farm output 222 
and/or trade water in each round to increase their final bequest value.5 In the experiment the model 223 
boiled down to farmers maximising the expected bank balance at death. These options are all 224 
clearly explained to the participants in the experimental instructions and detailed more fully in the 225 
following sections. 226 
Denote any net deposit in period t as 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. Credit markets are assumed to be perfect. 227 
Therefore, both deposits and debts are subject to the same interest rate r, and a farmer's bank 228 
balance evolves as: 229 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. 230 
Given this structure we can calculate the expected value a net deposit 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 will create: 231 







The period consumption utility function is standard and assumed to be increasing and 234 
concave. A farmer who chooses consumption in period t assesses the trade-off between 235 
consumption utility and the expected bequest and equalizes the expected marginal benefit of 236 
consuming and depositing returns from production: 237 
                                                          
5 Deposits simply accrued to the player’s account at the end of each period. Borrowing occurred when any player ran 
out of funds during the experiment. In those instances the adjudicator added monetary units to the player’s account so 











3.2 Production technology and farm types 239 
Farmers produce output using a simple production technology that requires input of water 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 240 
seed. For simplicity we assume that production results in a farm-specific fixed cost 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖. 241 
Normalizing the output price to unity, the net revenue for given water input is: 242 
𝜑𝜑�𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� − 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖�, 243 
where φ is an indicator for the farmer's decision to produce and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� denotes the sales value of 244 
the crop produced with the water quantity 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. In order to capture differences in farm sizes and 245 
productivity we allow for two types of farms 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖. Small farms mimic annual production systems 246 
with low fixed costs and lower output per unit of water, while large farms mimic perennial 247 
production systems with higher fixed costs but also higher outputs. Each market consists of four 248 
small and four large farmers indexed by s and l. For our experiments we use the following 249 
production function where 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠 = 1/3, 𝜃𝜃𝑙𝑙 = 2/3, and fixed cost 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 =55 and 𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙 =110: 250 
𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖� ≔ 100�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. 251 
3.3 Water licenses, rain and water markets 252 
Common to both treatments is that water is not yet fully revealed for the season when farmers have 253 
to decide to produce (or not).Farmers hold water licenses (and potentially forward contracts) at 254 
that point in time though, which can assist in reducing their forward risk. Depending on the weather 255 
conditions a farmer will be allocated either one (dry), two (normal) or three (wet) units of water 256 
per license (e.g. similar to real seasonal water allocations). Denote the weather by α ϵ {1, 2, 3}, 257 
which determines how much water is allocated per license. Farmers ex-ante do not know the realization 258 
of the weather but are aware of the associated probabilities Overall there are 24 water licenses in 259 
each market. In the license-trade treatment the number of licenses held per round will depend on 260 
previous trades, while in the forward-contract treatment each farmer holds three licenses fixed 261 
throughout the game. Once the weather is determined and water is allocated for the period a 262 
(4) 
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double-auction for water takes place.6 Instead of solving for a Bayesian Equilibrium in the double-263 
auction market we rely on previous theoretical and experimental work which shows that double-264 
auctions reliably lead to efficient allocations (e.g. Friedman, 1984, Vernon, 1962, Wilson, 1985). 265 
Using the efficiency condition we calculate the equilibrium price and corresponding efficient 266 
allocation for all possible weather conditions and configurations of producing farmers. 267 
We first derive individual demand for water. Clearly a farmer who has decided not to 268 
produce has zero-demand for water. Denote the price asked for seasonal water as p. The water 269 
demand of an individual producing farmer of type 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is thus given by: 270 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 = arg max𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡





Denoting the number of small and large farmers that have decided to produce as 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 and 𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙   273 





With total supply equal to 24α we can solve for the equilibrium price and for the equilibrium 276 
allocation of water after an efficient double-auction has taken place: 277 










3.4 The production decision 281 
As discussed, a farmer has to decide to enter the market before knowing how much water they will 282 
have, which is risky. Denote the probability of state α (weather outcomes) to eventuate as 𝛾𝛾𝛼𝛼. A 283 
risk-neutral farmer's optimal decision is to produce if their expected profit is greater than the profit 284 
                                                          
6 In reality, the production function for applied water would be a function of the weather, and may shift depending 
on the climate in any given period. The absence of this factor in the experiments may help to explain why the value 





from selling all their allocated water—without paying the fixed cost for production.7 The optimal 285 
decision will vary across farm types and will depend on who else enters the market. We need to 286 
find a configuration of production decisions that constitute mutual optimal decisions. In our 287 
experiments we had two different sets of weather probabilities. Markets start off with (𝛾𝛾1, 𝛾𝛾2,𝛾𝛾3) 288 
= (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) which represent the default climate. Later in the experiment a change to the climate 289 
parameters—the climate-change shock—provides less favourable probabilities (𝛾𝛾1,𝛾𝛾2, 𝛾𝛾3) = (0.7, 290 
0.15, 0.15). In the case of the default climate everybody should produce regardless of the 291 
distribution of licenses. Denote the number of water licenses firm i is holding in period t as 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. If 292 
a small farmer holding 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 licenses anticipates that all other farmers will produce, the expected 293 
payoff of producing is: 294 
ΕΠ𝑖𝑖 = Ε�𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤∗) − 𝑝𝑝∗�𝑤𝑤∗ − 𝛼𝛼𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�� − 𝐾𝐾𝑠𝑠 295 
= 1.4 + 28.2𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. 296 
This exceeds the profit from not producing and spot selling water at equilibrium prices (with 297 
one less small farmer producing) which is equal to 27𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. Large farmers also should produce since 298 
their expected profit from producing is: 299 
ΕΠ𝑖𝑖 = 2.8 + 28.2𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. 300 
This outcome is greater than 25.8𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, or the profit from selling all water in a market with one 301 
less large producer. Consequently, in equilibrium all farmers should produce regardless of their 302 
type or the allocation of water licenses. Moreover this is the only equilibrium, as with fewer 303 
farmers in the market the incentive to produce is higher due to lower water prices. Selling all one’s 304 
water in markets with fewer producers is less attractive due to low resulting water prices from less 305 
demand and increased supply. This leads us to formulate our first proposition: 306 
                                                          
7 Note that the assumption of risk-neutrality is not crucial here for the structure of equilibrium. Faced with unexpected 
unfavourable shocks, participants might shift to overly risk-averse behaviour (Brown, Harlow and Tinic, 1988). 
However, with strongly risk-averse farmers we would get a smaller number of entrants in equilibrium. Thus risk 
aversion should not play a large role in our experiments where the stakes are moderate. 
(8) 
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Proposition 1: For the default climate with (𝛾𝛾1, 𝛾𝛾2,𝛾𝛾3) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) all farmers are 307 
expected to produce and an efficient allocation of water is achieved through a double-308 
auction. The efficient water allocation is 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠∗ = 2𝛼𝛼 and 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗ = 4𝛼𝛼. Total expected profit 309 
is 694.2. 310 
Next we investigate what the stable configuration of farmers should be after the shock. It 311 
turns out that four different configurations can be sustained as an equilibrium: (𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙,𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠) = (4,2), 312 
(3,4), (4,1) and (3,3). Observe from Equations (5) and (6) that equilibrium price and total demand 313 
are identical as long as 2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙+𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 is constant. Therefore, the first two configurations lead to the same 314 
farmer profits. This is also true for the last two configurations. Whether the first or the last two 315 
configurations are equilibria depend on how the number of water licenses—or forward contracts—316 
are distributed. If licenses are evenly distributed across all farmers then the first two configurations 317 
are the only possible equilibria. In the case of a lopsided distribution of licenses, where either most 318 
licenses are held by the large or by the small farmers, the latter two configurations (with less 319 
farmers producing) result in equilibria. Table 1 shows the possible equilibrium configurations 320 
where ΔΕΠ𝜃𝜃 is the expected profit difference between producing and not producing for a farmer 321 
of type 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖, while Ε𝑊𝑊 denotes the expected total surplus created. 322 
Table 1: Equilibrium configurations after the climate shock 323 
(𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙,𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠) ΔΕΠ𝑙𝑙 ΔΕΠ𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝∗ (𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗,𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠∗) Ε𝑊𝑊 



















This leads us to our second proposition: 325 
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Proposition 2: After the climate shock for (𝛾𝛾1,𝛾𝛾2, 𝛾𝛾3) = (0.7, 0.15, 0.15), depending on 326 
license distributions, four equilibria are possible characterized by 2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙∗ + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠∗ = 10 or 327 
2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙∗ + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠∗ = 9 with water usage 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠∗ = 24𝛼𝛼/(2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙∗ + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠∗) and 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗ = 48𝛼𝛼/(2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙∗ + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠∗). 328 
The total profit is either 498.2 (2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 = 10) or 499.4 (2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 = 9). 329 
Here it is worth mentioning that our equilibrium concept is that of a stable situation where 330 
ex-post nobody can do better by changing their production decision. While this sounds like the 331 
standard Nash concept, it is not. Note that in our experiments farmers do not know the cost, 332 
production functions or license distribution for other farmers. Also no objective prior beliefs on 333 
these are induced. So there is ambiguity and the classic definition of a Bayesian game does not 334 
apply. The ambiguity faced by our subjects makes it very unlikely that equilibrium is actually 335 
reached. In our view this is an appealing feature of our environment as it allows us to introduce at 336 
least some of the complexity faced by real-world farmers. Moreover with our environment we will 337 
be able to distinguish between inefficiencies that arise from the farmers' decision to produce (or 338 
not) from those that arise because of water markets not being able to efficiently distribute water 339 
among producing farmers. 340 
3.5 Pre-production trading 341 
We now look at the role of pre-production water trading. Recall that we have two treatments. In 342 
one treatment farmers can trade licenses once a period. This trading takes place before production 343 
decisions have to be made. In the second treatment, instead of license trade forward contracts can 344 
be negotiated. In the forward market farmers can agree on trading volumes and prices conditional 345 
on the expected weather state (i.e. the allocation of water per license). These forward contracts are 346 
signed before production decisions are made. In what follows we show that both institutions should 347 
have no influence on efficiency under the assumption that spot markets work perfectly, and farmers 348 
follow the equilibrium production decisions outlined above. 349 
Value of a water license and license auctions 350 
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(9) 
Having determined how many and which farmers are expected to produce we can determine the 351 
value of a license for the first treatment. License auction prices should equal the expected benefit 352 
that a license provides. The immediate cash value of a unit of water is equal to its trading price. 353 
Therefore the expected cash equivalent for water that a license holder is entitled to in any given 354 









If the farmer dies at the end of period t then the license generates pay-off 𝛽𝛽Ε𝐶𝐶; where β is 357 
the parameter that measures how much the farmer values profits. If a farmer survives the next 358 
period, but then dies, the license generates a monetary equivalent this period and also one for next 359 
period. Additionally the money earned this period will attract interest. Therefore a farmer who 360 
lives exactly two periods gets the benefit of 𝛽𝛽Ε𝐶𝐶(2 + 𝑟𝑟). Thus, summing the probability-weighted 361 
expected returns yields the expected value of a license: 362 
𝑉𝑉𝑧𝑧 = 𝛽𝛽Ε𝐶𝐶(1 − 𝛿𝛿)∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇−1∞𝑇𝑇=1 ∑ (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡−1𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1  363 
=
𝛽𝛽Ε𝐶𝐶
1 − 𝛿𝛿(1 + 𝑟𝑟)
. 364 
With the parameters defined (i.e. a survival probability δ = 0.9, an interest rate of r = 0.05 365 
and a valuation per dollar earned of β =1) we can now calculate the value of a license conditional 366 
on being in the pre- or post-shock phase. In the license trade treatment the value is an equilibrium 367 
prediction for the price licenses are traded at. This leads us to our next proposition: 368 
Proposition 3: The value of a license before the climate shock for (𝛾𝛾1, 𝛾𝛾2,𝛾𝛾3) = (1/3, 369 
1/3, 1/3) is equal to 512.94. After the shock for (𝛾𝛾1,𝛾𝛾2, 𝛾𝛾3) = (0.7, 0.15, 0.15) the value 370 
of a license lies between 376.68 (if 2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 = 9) and 397.05 (if 2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 = 10). 371 
A reason for the decline in license values post-shock could be associated with the resource-372 
share nature of entitlements here, which means that water is more valuable when plentiful due to 373 
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the marginal value of additional production. Thus, under a reduction in supply treatment, the 374 
perceived value of the entitlement may decrease. Note our implicit assumption that the water 375 
auction within a production period works perfectly. This implies that one water license has exactly 376 
the same value for all farmers regardless of their type or their current holdings. For this reason no 377 
license trade should take place as there are no gains from trade. Moreover, under this assumption 378 
the license market has no role to play in improving over-all efficiency. With the value of a license 379 
calculated we can next calculate the equilibrium price. Recall that the opportunity cost of spending 380 
d units of money today is given by Equation (3). In equilibrium, the price should be equal to the 381 
deposit amount that would generate the same value as a license: 382 
(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑧𝑧∗
1 − 𝛿𝛿(1 + 𝑟𝑟)
=
𝛽𝛽Ε𝐶𝐶






Using our parameter values we can thus calculate the equilibrium license prices for the 385 
periods before and after the shock. This leads us to our final proposition: 386 
Proposition 4: The equilibrium price for a license before the climate shock for 387 
(𝛾𝛾1,𝛾𝛾2, 𝛾𝛾3) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is equal to 282.12. After the climate shock for (𝛾𝛾1,𝛾𝛾2, 𝛾𝛾3) 388 
= (0.7, 0.15, 0.15) the equilibrium price of a license lies between 207.17 (if 2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 =389 
9) and 218.38 (if 2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 = 10). 390 
Forward contracts 391 
The opportunity to write forward contracts conditional on stochastic weather outcomes simply 392 
duplicates the spot market, as that market unfolds once the weather is determined. The main 393 
difference is that when forward contracts are written farmers have not yet committed to produce 394 
(or not). As long as the equilibrium (i.e. production decisions and water auction outcomes) is 395 
anticipated by farmers, forward contracting is a perfect substitute to buying and selling water in 396 
the spot market; as discussed by Newbery and Stiglitz (1985). Conditionally then, forward 397 
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contracts do not have the capacity to influence efficiency. This result also does not depend on the 398 
assumption of risk-neutral farmers. Even if farmers are risk-averse, but foresee the outcomes in 399 
the water market, forward contracts have no special role to play. Forward contracts may instead 400 
be viewed by farmers as insurance contracts. Importantly though in the experiment they cannot 401 
provide more insurance than that provided by a working spot market. 402 
The role of pre-production trading under off-equilibrium play 403 
While pre-production trading has no role to play if the spot market works perfectly—and farmers 404 
could anticipate this—it may have an impact once we leave the equilibrium path. Suppose that a 405 
farmer is unsure what the spot price will be for different states of nature. In that case, a forward 406 
contract may provide valuable information and insurance as it takes place before the decision to 407 
produce (or not) has been made. For this reason we conjecture that forward contracting might be 408 
helpful in inducing optimal production decisions. The alternative license trade instrument 409 
addresses another concern farmers might have with respect to spot markets. Suppose some farmers 410 
fear that the market will not be liquid enough to support their purchase of seasonal water when 411 
required. Then, some farmers might not produce even if it were efficient to do so. In this case 412 
trading licenses might help, since purchasing additional licenses may insure farmers against 413 
incomplete spot water markets. Ex-ante it is unclear which of the two pre-production trading 414 
institutions performs better with respect to efficient production decisions and water allocations. 415 
This provides valuable justification for the experiment treatments used herein to test different 416 
water market product designs and mixtures. 417 
 418 
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 419 
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Table 2 summarizes the experimental design. Subjects (students) were instructed to think of 420 
themselves as farmers with a demand for water each season and a profit-maximizing objective.8 421 
They were able to utilize license/forward contracting and/or spot market trade to manage water 422 
demand, risk, and to maximize their bequest (i.e. their end payout). 423 
Table 2: Experimental design 424 
Treatment Pre-shock Post-shock 
 Spot trade only 
(control group) 
3 markets with 
8 participants each 
3 markets with 
8 participants each 
 Water license trade 
(with spot trade) 
10 markets with 
8 participants each 
10 markets with 
8 participants each 
 Forward contract trade 
(with spot trade) 
9 markets with 
8 participants each 
9 markets with 
8 participants each 
 425 
Recall there are two types of farms (four of each kind) in a market, with different production 426 
functions. One production function mimicked relatively low values for water and elastic demand 427 
(e.g. annual crop farmers such as wheat growers), while the other mimicked relatively higher 428 
values for water and inelastic water demand (e.g. perennial crop farmers such as fruit-tree 429 
growers). Subjects were randomly assigned to different farm types. Our treatments examined the 430 
effect of different pre-production trade mechanisms on efficiency. Subjects participated in one of 431 
the three treatments only, and all treatment subjects were exposed to the climate shock after seven 432 
periods. In all cases spot trade allowed participants to adjust their water holding for production 433 
after receiving information on their seasonal (period) water allocation. 434 
4.1 Structure of a production period 435 
                                                          
8 As discussed above the experimental design forced them to deal with some of the complexity faced by real farmers. 
Although common, the use of students in our experiment may draw criticism and concerns about the relevance of our 
findings in natural agricultural settings. It is possible that differentials between laboratory and natural settings may be 
over or under exaggerated (Levitt and List, 2007). Empirical evidence of the findings discussed herein would benefit 
greatly by capturing real farmer behaviour—as planned for future research rounds. 
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Table 3 summarizes the timing of a production period. Each subject began the experiment with 436 
equal units of: water licenses (three shares), money in their bank account (200 monetary units), 437 
and a fixed annual consumption requirement to survive (50 monetary units). Prior to starting the 438 
experiment subjects could ask questions of the adjudicators and participate in two practice rounds.9 439 
Table 3: Timing 440 
 Spot trade  License trade  Forward contract trade 
Instructions and training rounds 
Initial endowment of water and 
opening bank balance 
Instructions and training rounds 
Initial endowment of water and 
opening bank balance 
Instructions and training rounds 
Initial endowment of water and 
opening bank balance 
(no Stage 1 decision) Stage 1: License auction Stage 1: Forward contracts 
 - License shares updated 
- For dry, normal or wet conditions 
- Forward contracts established 
Stage 2: Production decision Stage 2: Production decision Stage 2: Production decision 
- Seasonal allocation outcome 
announced 
- Seasonal allocation outcome 
announced 
- Seasonal allocation outcome 
announced 
Stage 3: Spot market auction and 
production update 
Stage 3: Spot market auction and 
production update 
Stage 3: Spot market auction and 
production update 
  
- Conditional (e.g. wet) forward 
contracts executed 
- Penalties apply for default10 
Stage 4: Results Stage 4: Results Stage 4: Results 
Profit/loss calculated, interest paid 
and consumption subtracted. 
Random game-ending draw 
- game continues or ends 
Profit/loss calculated, interest paid 
and consumption subtracted. 
Random game-ending draw 
- game continues or ends 
Profit/loss calculated, interest paid 
and consumption subtracted. 
Random game-ending draw 
- game continues or ends 
Once the experiment had commenced subjects were not allowed to communicate with one 441 
another. In the license treatment subjects could buy or sell water licenses using a double-auction 442 
market; where subjects could submit bids and asks and accept current bids and asks. As the 443 
experiment progressed, previous sales-price information was provided as a reference. 444 
Alternatively in the forward contract treatment, subjects could create conditional agreements to 445 
buy or sell water units under dry, normal or wet water supply outcomes in the season ahead. 446 
Subjects could post forward contract bid prices for single water units that were contingent on a 447 
                                                          
9 The inclusion of practice rounds did not in our opinion generate confounding training effects similar to those reported 
by Godby et al. (1997). A full set of instructions are included as an appendix to this article. 
10 Participants unable to meet forward contract obligations (if executed) were penalised by having water purchased on 
their behalf at the spot price for that round, which was then used to fulfil the contract. This cost was then subtracted 
from their bank account at round’s-end. 
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certain weather condition materializing, or enter forward contracts by accepting already posted 448 
bids. At the conclusion of this stage water license holdings were updated or forward contracts were 449 
established in readiness for the season outcome. 450 
Stage two required subjects to decide whether or not they would enter into production for 451 
the round, and pay the associated fixed costs. To assist this decision each subject was provided 452 
with a table identifying the probability of different climate outcomes (dry, normal or wet), a 453 
corresponding volume of water allocation that would be provided under those conditions, and a 454 
table of revenue outcomes from farm water use in the case that they decided to produce. Time was 455 
provided for subjects to assess the relative advantages of differential water use (i.e. use in 456 
production or trading). Once these decision rounds were completed a random draw selected the 457 
seasonal outcome, subsequently communicated to subjects. As discussed, before the shock the 458 
probabilities of dry, normal or wet weather were uniformly one-third. After the climate-change 459 
shock dry condition probability increased to 70%, while normal and wet conditions each prevailed 460 
with a 15% probability. The change in weather-state probabilities was clearly communicated to 461 
subjects in all treatments. In the forward contract treatment only forward contracts (e.g. contracts 462 
stipulating dry season execution) that matched with the resultant seasonal outcome (e.g. dry 463 
seasonal conditions) needed to be honoured. All other forward contracts were considered forfeit 464 
and no further action was needed.11 Any subjects that executed contracts for more water than they 465 
had/received were penalised for not being able to meet their obligations and ‘forced’ to buy water 466 
in the spot market at the average price for that round, to cover that shortfall. All subjects were 467 
made well aware of this via the instructions and adjudicator statements prior to the experiments. 468 
In stage three subjects were given the opportunity to adjust their water holdings through spot 469 
trade. Again a double-auction system allowed subjects to buy or sell whole units of water via a bid 470 
                                                          
11 As such, there was no transaction cost associated with these contracts that would be forfeit if they did not proceed. 
On that basis, the product here may arguably be closer to an option contract. On reflection, it would have been useful 
to include some transaction costs into the experiment, and this is intended in future treatments. 
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and ask process (similar to how water is actually traded). All units of water held were automatically 471 
used for production. Water could not be carried forward into subsequent rounds of the experiment. 472 
Finally in stage four of the experiment the outcome of decision-making over the course of the 473 
round was calculated for each subject. Information included: the opening bank balance; interest 474 
earned or paid; consumption during the period; water license holdings traded or forward contracts 475 
entered into; farm production and water trade outcomes; as well as the closing bank balance. The 476 
appendix document provides greater detail on the process. 477 
4.2 Experimental procedure 478 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Adelaide's experimental economics laboratory 479 
AdLab using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited from the University 480 
of Adelaide student population between September 2012 and March 2013 with the help of the 481 
online-recruiting software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Each subject interacted anonymously with other 482 
subjects in a market of eight participants. In our sessions we had up to three markets operating 483 
simultaneously. Overall we had 22 markets across our treatments all with a stochastic stopping 484 
rule. The probability of stopping after any period was 10 percent. We used three ex-ante draws for 485 
all treatments that yielded 13, 14 and 15 total periods.12 In total, approximately 1500 students listed 486 
on the system were invited to participate in the experiments, and of those the first 176 to sign up 487 
were recruited. Each subject stayed in the same group for the whole experiment. Sessions lasted 488 
two and a half hours on average, and each period played earned the subject AUD$1.50. For every 489 
additional 50 points earned in the game we paid AUD$1.00; held constant for all subjects. The 490 
average earning was around AUD$37.00 inclusive of a turn-up fee, and students were paid in cash. 491 
Finally, at the end of each session subjects were asked to complete some concluding survey 492 
questions on their demographics. 493 
                                                          
12 Note that the number of periods was slightly above the expected number given the stopping rule, which was 11. 




5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 495 
By acquiring water licenses farmers increase their water allocations conditional on the weather. 496 
Farmers owning a large number of licenses may have reduced uncertainty and incentive to 497 
purchase further water in the market. Forward contracts have a similar function. Farmers can—498 
before they decide to produce (or not)—purchase future access to water from other farmers, 499 
thereby reducing uncertainty. Note that theoretically neither of the two institutions is required in 500 
order to achieve efficiency. In a world of fully rational farmers with corresponding rational 501 
expectations a spot water market should be sufficient. We conjecture that if this is not the case 502 
limited information and cognitive abilities as well as decision errors are likely to lead to inefficient 503 
production decisions. If this is the case, however, then license trade and forward contracts have 504 
the potential to enhance efficiency. 505 
To structure the results we first examine the distribution of trades across the three products for 506 
each period (Figure 1). 507 
 508 
Figure 1: Trade volumes for each water product, by period 509 
We can see that trade of both spot water and forward contract products overshadow that of licenses, 510 
although early trade of licenses can be relatively high. Some license trade continues in each period 511 
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as the farmers seek to achieve their objectives. But which of the three institutions achieves a higher 512 
level of efficiency? An analysis of this question will establish the main result of our paper. We 513 
then search for the root causes of that result by looking at the functioning of the experimental water 514 
markets, production decisions of farmers and their trading behaviour in license and forward 515 
contract markets. 516 
5.1 Total surplus 517 
The first question we want to answer is how different trading institutions impact on overall 518 
efficiency. To achieve this we take the total profit (surplus) generated in a market per period by a 519 
group of subjects as the dependent variable and estimate panel models with a random effect on the 520 
group level. As we do not have consumers in our experiment from which to draw an estimate of 521 
their utility created by water allocations during the experiment we simply calculate the producer 522 
surplus, which in this case is their profit. We are initially interested in how forward contracting 523 
impacts on profitability compared to spot markets alone using license trade as a base. We control 524 
for weather and learning dynamics through two models: 1) featuring period dummies and 2) 525 
featuring a dummy for the post-shock phase after period seven (Table 4). 526 
There is a significant treatment effect that does not depend on the specification. Forward 527 
contracts are on average more efficient than license trade by about 35 to 36 monetary units. Further, 528 
forward contracts are on average 22 monetary units higher than spot market trades. This efficiency 529 
difference across treatments is significant (P<0.001) and amounts to about 5% of the total expected 530 
equilibrium surplus before—and about 7% after—the climate shock. 531 
  532 
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Table 4: Random-effect GLS estimation of water market profits 533 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Treatment Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error 
License trade (base) — — — — 
Forward contract 35.77*** 11.05 36.36** 10.73 
Spot market only 14.33 15.55 14.77 15.13 
Weather (Base = dry)     
Normal 352.42*** 8.99 350.03*** 8.28 
Wet 599.01*** 7.74 596.70*** 7.15 
     
Post-shock - 14.71** 6.17 
Period Dummies Yes No 
     
Constant 290.26*** 13.74 295.15*** 8.61 
N 315 315 
ρ 0.124 0.119 
R2 0.966 0.965 
*** = significance at p<0.01 534 
 535 
Result 1: Forward contracts lead to more efficient market outcomes than spot market 536 
and/or license trade. The effect is highly statistically significant and economically 537 
relevant. 538 
Next we compare the level of efficiency achieved with that in the constrained optimum 539 
which is equal to (1 – relative efficiency)*100. In Table 5 we use the predicted values for the profit 540 
from model two above and compare it to the profit that would prevail under equilibrium play. 541 



















































* Standard deviations reported in parentheses. 543 
The difference between optimal and treatment profits are generally largest where more water 544 
is available. Spot markets alone generally underperform other institutions pre-shock, except in dry 545 
conditions. Further, license trade can lead to poorer outcomes particularly if bad choices occur 546 
early (e.g. premature selling). Multivariate testing of the treatment outcomes across periods 547 
supported the differential evolution of treatments over the course of the experiment 548 
(ProbF>0.000). The constrained optimum is based on farmers producing without knowing how 549 
much water will be available. Wrong market entry decisions can lead to farmers doing better under 550 
certain weather conditions than they would in equilibrium; while they may equally do worse in 551 
others. Post-estimation Wald testing for weather, treatment and group effects determined that on 552 
average across all weather conditions distorted market entry reduced market welfare. Generally 553 
we find that forward contracting water markets achieve closest to constrained optimum results, 554 
especially after the climate shock. 555 
Result 2: Forward contracting water markets achieve closest to constrained optimum 556 
results especially after the climate shock. 557 
 558 
5.2 Causes of the welfare losses 559 
Here we adopt the classic definition of welfare losses as the reduction in consumer and producer 560 
surplus that results from too much (little) production and consumption of, in this case, farming 561 
resources. Expanding on these two dimensions of the allocation problem (i.e. the production 562 
decision and the allocation of water) can be instructive for decomposing the welfare losses into 563 
27 
those stemming from distorted production decisions and those caused by water markets not 564 
properly allocating the water. We will look at these two dimensions in turn, starting with distorted 565 
production decisions. 566 
Production decisions 567 
Recall that before the shock constraint optimality requires that all farmers decide to produce. 568 
Regardless of the current number of water licenses held a fully rational farmer who foresees the 569 
outcome in the water market would decide to produce. Having all farmers produce maximizes the 570 
expected total profitability—where the expectation is calculated over the different weather 571 
conditions before they are determined. Thus, before the shock a farmer not producing creates a 572 
welfare loss in expected terms. After the climate shock less water is available, and therefore not 573 
all farmers should produce. As shown above there are a few different configurations with respect 574 
to the number and type of farmers who decide to produce, which generate equilibria; recalling that 575 
in each experiment group we have equal numbers of small and large farms. 576 
The equilibrium condition is 2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠  ∈ {9, 10}, where 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 and 𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 are the number of small and 577 
large farmers that produce. The profit for all potential equilibrium configurations is approximately 578 
the same: (either 498.2 or 499.4). Therefore, whenever 2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 < 9 we experience a welfare loss 579 
due to too few farmers producing. In the case 2𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙 + 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 > 10 we also get an efficiency loss due to 580 
too many farmers producing. Table 6 reports the fraction of markets with too-much, an optimal 581 
degree of (efficient), or too-little production entry by treatment for the pre- and post-shock phase. 582 
 583 
Table 6: Number of producing farmers relative to optimum 584 
 
 Spot market License Forward 
 Too little 52.38 87.41 73.02 
Pre-shock Efficient 47.62 12.86 26.98 
 Too much  -  -  - 
 Too little 19.05 59.46 27.27 
Post-shock Efficient 38.10 32.43 48.48 
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 Too much 42.86 8.11 24.24 
 585 
Pre-shock all treatments tend toward under-production when in theory pre-shock is the 586 
optimal time to produce. Spot markets perform best. But post-shock there is higher variability in 587 
the spot market and license treatments, while forward contracts achieve the most efficient outcome 588 
between balanced over- and under-production. The effect is considerably smaller in the forward 589 
contract treatment, as confirmed by multivariate testing of the means (ProbF>0.000), which 590 
determines which combination of treatments performs the best out of all possible combinations. In 591 
the post-shock phase there is still systematically too-much entry in the spot market and too-little 592 
entry in the license trade treatment, while close to half the sessions in the forward contract 593 
treatment exhibit an optimal mix of farmer production. 594 
Result 3: Efficient configurations of production decisions occur more often in the 595 
forward contracts treatment. 596 
Water allocation among producing farmers 597 
The second source of welfare loss is the misallocation of water amongst farmers that have entered 598 
the water market. If the double-auction spot market for water worked perfectly, regardless of the 599 
treatment and the number of farmers who decided to produce, then there should be no welfare loss 600 
other than that from suboptimal production decisions. Our findings show that there are 601 
considerable welfare losses dependent on weather and treatment. Comparison of welfare across 602 
weather conditions, treatments and configurations of producing farms is therefore needed. For this 603 
purpose we concentrate on profits generated as a fraction of the maximum possible profitability 604 
given weather and production decisions (Table7). Random-effects Tobit models are used due to 605 
the censored nature of the efficiency outcomes following production decisions. 606 
Table 7: Random-effects Tobit estimates of trade product’s relative efficiency 607 
Treatment Coeff. Std. Error 
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License trade (base) — — 
Forward contract 0.008 0.019 
Spot market only -0.022 0.025 
Initial license endowment -0.004*** 0.001 
Weather (base = dry)   
Normal 0.037*** 0.011 
Wet 0.030*** 0.009 
   
Period 0.006*** 0.002 
Post-shock 0.000 0.016 
Constant 0.883*** 0.017 
N 315 
ρ 0.143 
log L 377.884 
*** = significance at p<0.01 608 
 609 
In general our double-auction institution for water trading does very well. On average 92.9% 610 
of the maximum profit is actually realized; albeit with differences across the treatments. The 611 
double-auction in the license trade treatment only delivers 90.6% of potential profit, which is 612 
significantly lower than the 95.5% in the forward contract treatment. At first this is somewhat 613 
surprising as the same double-auction is used in both treatments. In Table 7 the relative efficiency 614 
created by a market is the dependent variable, and independent variables include a dummy for: the 615 
forward contract treatment; the variance of license holdings in a market; controls for weather and 616 
the climate shock; as well as a time trend. The forward contract treatment dummy is not statistically 617 
significant, although it is positive. Instead the significant differences observed in the relative 618 
efficiencies across treatments come from a negative effect of unequal distribution of licenses in 619 
the license trade treatment. The efficiency that double-auctions can provide is increased where 620 
there is greater relative equality in the distribution of water licenses. Note that unequal distributions 621 
of water licenses can only occur in the license trade treatment. This finding is contrary to other 622 
experimental results involving double-auctions where monopoly and monopsony parties may 623 
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exercise market power (e.g. Muller, Mestelman, Spraggon and Godby, 2002). The critical 624 
difference in this experiment is that the unequal distribution is generated by poor early trade 625 
decisions, not uneven initial distributions consistent with monopoly, monopsony or oligopoly 626 
market structures. Thus, where the distribution in our experiment remains relatively equal, subjects 627 
are not able to exercise undue market power over one another. 628 
Result 4: The created surplus relative to the maximum for given production and 629 
weather decisions is higher in the forward contract treatment. The double-auction 630 
institution produces less efficient water allocations if the experiments tend toward 631 
unequal license distributions. 632 
Table 7 results also show the relative inefficiency is greater if water is scarce (i.e. weather 633 
conditions are dry). Moreover there is a time trend. With increasing subject experience, the double-634 
auction does a better and better job of allocating water. Over the full duration of the experiment 635 
(13 to 15 rounds) the relative efficiency increased by about 9%. 636 
Decomposing the total welfare loss 637 
We next decomposed the welfare loss into that caused by production decisions and that caused by 638 
water market inefficiencies. The profit that could be optimally achieved for a given weather 639 
situation was calculated and then subtracted from the welfare loss in the water market (conditional 640 
on the entry decision). The remaining gap between this figure and the actual welfare is the loss 641 
that resulted from suboptimal entry decisions of farmers. Figure 2 shows the result by treatment, 642 
and before and after the shock, as a fraction of the total available profits. The forward contract 643 
treatment does better in all respects as supported by multivariate testing for weather, group, period 644 
and shock effects (ProbF>0.000). Losses due to both production and water market entry decisions 645 
are smaller, both before and after the shock. 646 
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 647 
Figure 2: The causes of welfare losses 648 
Result 5: Forward contracts achieve more efficient production decisions and lead to 649 
more efficient water markets, both before and after a climate shock. 650 
5.3 License prices 651 
Finally we considered water license pricing. Recall that the equilibrium price of a license 652 
was calculated at 218 monetary units before—and 207 monetary units after—the shock. Since it 653 
is very hard for subjects to ex-ante estimate the value of a license we would expect them to have 654 
quite heterogeneous beliefs about prices. Indeed mean trading prices of licenses were off by about 655 
100% before the shock, while prices were in the right vicinity after the shock. Again we observe 656 
prices rising after the shock instead of dropping as prescribed by equilibrium. Subjects seeking 657 
water access after the climate shock reduced the expected amount of water per license. Thus any 658 
mispricing of water licenses (Figure 3) does not necessarily reduce efficiency. 659 
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 660 
Figure 3: Average license prices 661 
The mispricing of licenses in conjuncture with the working of the water market does lead to 662 
welfare losses. If mispricing arises from substantial heterogeneity in the beliefs about the value of 663 
a license then license trading leads to a concentration in the hands of those with the highest value. 664 
Above we have seen that water markets become less efficient the more unequal the distribution of 665 
licenses. So indirectly license trade leads to higher welfare losses than forward contracts. Another 666 
socially undesirable effect promoted by license trade is that due to the mispricing of licenses wealth 667 
inequality becomes large. 668 
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Figure 4 shows the distribution of Gini coefficients (the distribution of wealth subjects had 671 
accumulated in period 13 for all 22 groups of eight farmers) by treatment. On average, in the 672 
license trade treatment the Gini coefficient was almost three times as large as in the forward 673 
contract treatment (0.32 vs. 0.11) and the difference is highly statistically significant (p<0.002, 674 
Mann Whitney U-Test, two-sided). Forward contracting also moderately outperformed the spot 675 
market, as expected. 676 
Result 6: Licenses are mispriced which leads to inequality in license holdings, 677 
increased inefficiency in the water market, and larger wealth inequality than in the 678 
forward contract treatment. 679 
 680 
6. CONCLUSION 681 
The use of water markets is advocated as a useful economic instrument to address growing water 682 
scarcity around the world. This study reports on a series of experiments that compare the efficiency 683 
properties of three types of water market product that aim to efficiently allocate scarce water and 684 
influence production decisions. These product types include: a spot market (control group), a water 685 
license market and forward contracts—both with later stage double-auction clearing markets. In 686 
our experimental environment forward contracts generally fared better and improved market 687 
efficiency. This was particularly true after an unanticipated climate shock reduced expected water 688 
supply. License trading suffered from the problem that the value of water licenses is difficult to 689 
calculate, as it is a claim over an uncertain future stream of water allocations. The heterogeneity 690 
of beliefs about the value of a license led to a concentration of water licenses in the hands of those 691 
who believed it would be worth more in future periods. In the later double-auction stage market 692 
trade subsequent unequal allocation distributions led to welfare losses; since the later double-693 
auctions tended to produce less efficient outcomes under uneven water distributions. Moreover, 694 
poor early license trading also led to a subsequent high degree of wealth inequality among farmers. 695 
34 
Forward contracts did not suffer from these problems and were—for a given number of farmers 696 
who decided to produce—significantly more efficient. A second advantage of the forward contract 697 
market was that it improved production decisions and therefore social welfare. 698 
This paper strongly suggests that forward contracts are the better market institution to assist 699 
market participants to deal with water supply uncertainty. However, a few points of caution are in 700 
order. The nature of our study implies that our results should be only interpreted qualitatively. 701 
Moreover, while we tried to make the environment as generic and general as possible, we still had 702 
to make some design choices which could have influenced the results. An example of this is the 703 
split-nature of the climate shock treatment, which may make it difficult to disentangle learning 704 
effects from our interpretation of the results. Further, since the fixed costs in this experiment were 705 
only associated with seed costs, and do not consider longer-term impacts from entitlement trade 706 
such as farm entry and exit decisions, future variations on this research would seek to examine 707 
those issues more closely. For this reason some further research that makes different choices would 708 
be valuable. Further beneficial research may include replicating these experiments with actual 709 
farmers to generate robust empirical support for these findings. Other variations could include 710 
introducing transaction costs (as done in Lefebvre et al., 2012 in another context) and examining 711 
variations with the length of training periods to disentangle any learning effects across participants. 712 
Furthermore, our novel dynamic modelling approach could be used to evaluate the expected 713 
performance of different instruments in specific regions. Estimating intertemporal rainfall 714 
distributions and production functions for real world regions and embedding it in our experimental 715 
framework could generate quantitative predictions of many key outcomes (efficiency, production 716 
level, and evolution of wealth and income distributions) conditional on the market instruments 717 
used. Similarly, our framework can be used to more realistically test which market institutions are 718 
better suited to induce necessary structural change in response to a changing climate. 719 
 720 
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